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Will The Real Family-Friendly Employer Please Stand Up:  
Who Permits Parents To Reduce Working Hours For Purposes of Childcare? 
 
  The problem of balancing work and family life is particularly onerous when an 
employee wants to work fewer hours in order to deal with a family crisis. This is 
probably easiest for an acute crisis for which a couple of days off is required. More 
complicated are long term problems, e.g., a sick or injured child that requires several 
months of care. This paper examines how employers react to an especially difficult 
family-work issue: an employee who wants to move from full-time to part-time in order 
to care for a young child.  
One reason to examine movements from full-time to part-time is that they seem to 
fall outside the purview of the existing literature on family friendly policies. The focus of 
this literature is principally on formal policies like maternity leave, paternity leave, and 
leave beyond that required by the Family and Medical Leave Act. Empirical work is 
often based on an index that combines several different “family friendly” policies, 
declaring employers with high values of the index “progressive.” It is not at all clear how 
these progressive employers would deal with an employee who wants to move from full-
time to part-time in order to care for a child. The situation may be more a matter of 
informal practice than formal policy. Indeed, organizations with codified formal policies 
may be precisely the kinds of employers who do not permit such a shift from full-time to 
part-time.  
Of course, both formal and informal policies and practices can play a role in 
alleviating work-family tensions, and both are thereby good topics for investigation. It is 
surely not the case that formal policies are always superior. There are, for example, 
situations where individual circumstances are more easily addressed through informal   2
mechanisms. Formal policies may be adopted not because they are more effective, but 
because organizational size renders informal mechanisms unwieldy. Moreover, it is 
interesting to examine the extent to which ideas that have been tested using data on 
formal family-friendly policies can be extended to less visible employer practices, i.e., 
practices that – while family-friendly – may not be included in the employer’s written 
description of personnel or fringe benefit policies.  
Thus, this paper analyzes establishment level data on whether an employer is 
willing to accommodate an employee who wants to reduce hours in order to care for a 
child. In doing so the paper pursues two goals: (1) understanding what types of 
employers permit such a reduction in hours; and (2) understanding whether employers 
who permit such a reduction tend to also offer more formal “family friendly” policies 
such as paid maternity and paternity leave. 
 
I. The Literature  
 
The existing literature on employer responsiveness to work-family issues often 
focuses on employer financed benefits or services. For example, an organization that 
provides on-site day care or pays for day care away from the work place is reasonably 
viewed as responsive to work-family issues (Ingram and Simons (1995), Osterman 
(1995), Goodstein (1994)). Fringe benefits like paid maternity and paternity leave are 
also important (Ingram and Simons (1995), Galinsky and Bond (1998)). Finally, a 
responsive employer has formal policies that assure flexibility in hours like flextime or 
parental leave for infant care (Trzcinski (1991), Galinsky and Bond (1998)). There is no 
question that such policies reveal family-friendly employers. One worries, however, that 
this emphasis on formal policies and fringe benefits could bias results toward large 
organizations. Smaller organizations may use informal practices to address similar work-  3
family issues. Indeed, smaller organizations may have the luxury of addressing each 
employee’s situation individually and thus not need to establish formal policies.  
Such worries are reinforced by the frequent use of indexes of family friendly 
policies. For example, as their dependent variable in a multivariate analysis Ingram and 
Simons (1995) use an index whereby an organization is ranked as most responsive to 
work-family issues when it provided a “dependent care service” as well as a “flexible 
workplace option.” To satisfy this criterion, the firm must have a formal policy that pays 
for a benefit or service. Goodstein (1994) and Osterman (1995) use a similar index in 
their work. While the indexes in some of these studies apparently include informal 
practices, such practices are viewed as inferior to more formal policies. Ingram and 
Simons, for example, treat unpaid paternity leave as a type of work-family policy and 
apparently include informal practices as part of this. Yet, unpaid paternity leave is viewed 
as a “cheap response” (1995, page 1472), and not on the same plane as (say) subsidized 
child care.  
  Research that uses such indexes consistently finds that large organizations are 
more responsive to work-family issues than small organizations. Summarizing the 
literature, Fredriksen-Golden and Scharlach (2001, p. 194) write, “companies with fewer 
than 100 employees are significantly less likely than larger firms with over 100 
employees to offer benefits such as retirement, health insurance, life insurance, disability 
insurance, or paid time off.”  Along these lines, after arguing that large organizations are 
more visible and are under more pressure to respond to work-family concerns, Ingram 
and Simons (1995, p. 1468) go on to cite a literature indicating that, “large organizations 
have also been found to be more responsive to work-family issues.” This result arises in 
contingency tables (Ingram and Simons, 1995, Table 1) as well as multivariate analyses 
(Ingram and Simons, 1995, Table 3; Osterman, 1995, Table 3; Wood, 1999, Table 6).    4
The present paper examines whether a similar result arises for an alternative measure of 
employer responsiveness to work-family issues.  
 
 
II. Theoretical Framework 
 
  This section lays out hypotheses on what kinds of employers are likely to permit 
an employee to shift from full-time to part-time in order to care for a young child. At the 
outset it should be noted that there are potential advantages to such flexibility for both the 
employer and the parent. From the parent’s perspective, such part-time work can permit 
care of a sick or otherwise needy child while providing earnings, maintaining connections 
to informal networks, and avoiding loss of firm-specific skills. From the employer’s 
perspective, such flexibility can enhance retention of valued employees. Moreover, at 
least in comparison to paid parental leave, a part-time arrangement may facilitate 
employer monitoring and thereby mitigate moral hazard problems.  
At least two theoretical frameworks provide insights into what kind of employer 
permits such a reduction in hours. First, economic theory can be used to develop a model 
of a cost-minimizing firm that decides whether to let an employee work part-time. Such a 
theory provides an explanation for why different employers offer different opportunities 
for part-time work.
1 Second, much of the work on employer responsiveness to work-
family issues is built upon institutional theory in sociology.
2 According to that theory, 
organizations differ in their need to maintain organizational legitimacy and thus differ in 
their response to pressures to adopt progressive work-family practices.  
In part because we do not have the data necessary for a rigorous test of 
institutional theory,
3 this paper primarily relies on economic theories of part-time work. 
Here we lay out four hypotheses for why employers differ in their propensity to permit a 
shift from full-time to part-time for purposes of childcare: organizational size, minimum   5
hours constraints, employee demands, and long-term contracts.  The first hypothesis 
comes from institutional theory, and the latter three from labor economics. 
Institutional theory in sociology argues that large organizations are more visible 
and held to higher standards than small organizations. Both Goodstein (1994, p. 357) and 
Ingram and Simons (1995, p. 1466) state this as follows: “the greater the size of an 
organization, the greater its level of responsiveness to institutional pressures for employer 
involvement in work-family issues.” For similar reasons, public sector organizations 
should be particularly responsive to institutional pressures.  According to Ingram and 
Simons (1995, p. 1469), “public sector organizations will be more responsive than private 
sector organizations to institutional pressures for employer involvement in work-family 
issues.” Applied to this paper’s measure of employer responsiveness to work-family 
issues, we have:  
Hypothesis 1: Industrial Sector and Organization Size. Establishments that are part of 
large organizations and/or public sector organizations are more likely to permit 
employees to shift from full-time to part-time for purposes of childcare, ceteris paribus. 
 
One way that this paper contributes to the literature is by examining the effects of 
industrial sector and organization size on a measure of employer responsiveness that 
includes informal policies. Such a measure may have advantages over measures that are 
strictly based on formal policies. This is because, as established in an earlier line of 
sociological research, large and public organizations tend to be bureaucratic and thereby 
more inclined to adopt formal procedures (see Pugh et. al., 1969 or Mintzberg, 1979). A 
measure of responsiveness that is based on formal policies could yield statistically 
significant results that are influenced by relationships between the explanatory variables 
and formality. That is less likely to be a problem for the measure used here.  
The second hypothesis arises out of the economic literature on minimum hour 
constraints.  Regardless of an employee’s reason for wanting to shift from full-time to   6
part-time work, employer restrictions on the number of hours an employee must work 
may cause employers to prohibit the shift (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1983). If employers 
require their employees to work a minimum number of hours per week, month and/or 
year, then the employees can only reduce hours by quitting and taking a different job.  
This can be stated as:  
Hypothesis 2. Minimum Hours Constraints. Establishments that impose minimum 
hours constraints on their employees are less likely to permit employees to shift from 
full-time to part-time for purposes of child care, ceteris paribus. 
 
It is usually argued that the driving force behind minimum hours constraints is the 
firm’s technology; the technology is such that part-time work is costly to the firm. This 
idea takes at least three forms: 
1.  Team Production; In some jobs efficiency requires that a team of workers be 
present (Nollen, Eddy and Martin, 1978). While an assembly line and a football 
team are classic example, there are other jobs such as police services that require 
people to work the same hours so that they can interact as members of a team. 
  
2.  Quasi-Fixed Employment Costs: Quasi-fixed employment costs do not change 
with hours worked. Examples are hiring and training costs. Economic theory 
predicts that employers will only bear part of these costs in anticipation of 
recovering the rest of the cost over the duration of the employment relationship. A 
minimum hours constraint may be part of this cost recovery; if an employee 
works less than the minimum hours constraint, then the employer may not fully 
recover the initial fixed cost. In fact, there exists evidence that the proportion of a 
firm’s workforce that is part-time declines with the magnitude of hiring and 
training costs (Montgomery, 1988).  
 
3.  Supervisory Costs: Another reason for minimum hours constraints – a reason 
quite similar to quasi-fixed costs – is supervisory cost. Nollen, Eddy and Martin 
(1977) indicate that the problem is primarily one of scheduling complexities. 
“Either there is more scheduling of workers to be done because there are more 
workers or scheduling is harder because part-time workers are not continuously 
available or work irregular schedules.” (page 45)  
 
Empirical work requires observable proxies for constraints on the minimum 
number of hours an employee must work. Obvious proxies are variables that indicate the 
extent to which an establishment permits less than full-time work. As detailed below, the 
subsequent empirical work uses the establishment’s policy on job sharing as well as the   7
presence of part-time workers as indicators of workplaces that do not impose constraints 
on the minimum number of hours an employee must work.  Similarly, we use the 
establishment’s policy on flexible starting times as an indicator. Michael Hurd has argued 
that flexible starting times reveal the absence of team production (Hurd, 1996 p. 25). 
A third hypothesis views worker needs and demands as the primary determinant 
of work-family policies. Since different workers have different needs, if a large fraction 
of an establishment’s workforce is interested in certain types of policies or fringe 
benefits, then it can be in the employer’s interest to respond.  It follows that an 
employer’s attitude toward shifts from full-time to part-time for purposes of childcare 
will be a function of establishment demographics. Thus:    
Hypothesis 3: Employee Demand. Establishments with employee groups that are 
disproportionately likely to care for young children are more likely to permit employees 
to shift from full-time to part-time for purposes of child care, ceteris paribus. 
 
This hypothesis has antecedents in the theory of compensating differentials (e.g., 
Rosen, 1986). Accordingly, employers grant employee demands for costly workplace 
amenities either because this helps with retention of valued employees or because some 
other form of compensation (such as money wages) can be reduced. While evidence for 
employer responsiveness to worker demands often focuses on the effects of unions (e.g., 
Freeman 1981; Buchmueller, Dinardo, and Valletta 2002), there are good reasons to 
expect a similar effect in nonunion workplaces.  
Empirical work requires measures of workplace demographics that are associated 
with demand for family-friendly policies. One such measure – a measure that is standard 
in the literature on family-friendly policies – is the percent of workers who are female. 
Another feasible measure is the age of the establishment’s work force. If a high 
percentage of the establishment’s workforce is over 55 years of age, then one would 
expect less demand for flexibility with regard to child care.     8
A fourth hypothesis arises out of the literature on training and implicit contracts. 
Employers differ in the extent to which they encourage long-term employment 
relationships. Some want to retain workers until they reach retirement, while others 
accept high turnover rates. Employers with a strong interest in retaining workers would 
seem particularly likely to accommodate those with a young child. To not do so is to risk 
low morale and quits by valued employees. Thus:  
Hypothesis 4: Long-Term Relationships. Establishments characterized by long-term 
employment relationships are more likely to permit employees to shift from full-time to 
part-time for purposes of childcare, ceteris paribus. 
 
There are several explanations for why some employers encourage long-term 
relationships. Perhaps the most prominent explanations posit that some employers 
provide their workers with firm-specific training, i.e., training that only has value in that 
specific firm. Much as with quasi-fixed costs, the employer will have an interest in 
recovering the cost of such training. Since that is not possible if the worker quits shortly 
after receiving the training, the employer has a strong interest in retaining the worker. A 
second closely related explanation for long-term relationships arises out of the implicit 
contract literature. The argument here is that for some productive activities, it is difficult 
for employers to monitor worker performance. These employers use implicit contracts 
that are structured so as to discourage workers from cheating or shirking, and such  
contracts tend to be long-term contracts (Lazear 1979, 1981; Hutchens 1986; Bulow and 
Summers 1986).
4  
  The subsequent empirical work requires proxies for long-term employment 
relationships. As detailed below, five variables are used for this purpose: a measure of 
employer provided formal training;
5 a variable indicating whether workers are likely to 
remain with the firm until retirement; a variable indicating the extent to which jobs are   9
filled from the inside; and measures of the fraction of workers with long and short job 
tenures.  
Although the first of our four hypothesis is drawn explicitly from institutional 
theory in sociology, the last three hypotheses are by no means foreign to this literature.
6 
Of particular importance is the employee demand hypothesis. After noting that working 
women face particularly strong work-family pressures because they often bear primary 
responsibility for child care, and after citing an extensive list of previous works, 
Goodstein hypothesizes, “the greater the dependence of an organization on female 
employees, the greater its level of responsiveness to institutional pressures for employer 
involvement in work-family issues.” (1994, page 358). The same idea is found in Ingram 
and Simons (1995, p. 1468), Osterman (1995) and Guthrie and Roth (1999).  
 
 
III. The Data 
  The subsequent analysis is based on a representative sample of 947 
establishments. An establishment is defined as a single physical location at which 
business is conducted or services or industrial operations are performed. An 
establishment may or may not be part of a larger organization. For example, a school may 
be one of several establishments that belong to a school district. For purposes of studying 
an employer’s actual behavior, establishment level data is arguably better than data 
collected from the larger organization. In contrast to (say) a survey of upper-level 
executives at corporate headquarters, establishment level respondents are more likely to 
know how policy is implemented in practice.  
The survey was undertaken for the purpose of studying phased retirement among 
white-collar workers.
7 As such, the sample was restricted to establishments not engaged   10
in either agriculture or mining with twenty or more employees and at least two white-
collar employees who are age 55 or more.
8  
  The sample universe was the Dun and Bradstreet Strategic Marketing Record for 
December 2000. These data come from credit checks, although information is also 
obtained from the U.S. Postal Service, banks, newspapers, yellow pages, and other public 
records. To insure sufficient numbers of large establishments, the sample was stratified 
by establishment size. When appropriate the subsequent results are weighted to insure 
representative samples. The survey was executed by the University of Massachusetts 
Center for Survey Research between June 2001 and November 2002.  
The survey was conducted by telephone. The survey research firm first contacted 
the establishment and asked for the person who is best able to answer questions about 
flexible work schedules and employee benefits, for example a human resource manager 
or benefits manager. Interviews were conducted with a CATI (Computer Assisted 
Telephone Interviewing) system, thereby permitting an interview to be completed over 
several phone calls. The median number of telephone calls to complete an interview was 
10, with 10% of the interviews requiring 30 or more calls to complete.  
The overall response rate was 61%.  Most of the nonresponse occurred when 
screening establishments for eligibility (e.g., at least two white-collar employees age 
55+), and before respondents knew the purpose of the survey. Interviews were completed 
in 89% of the establishments that were successfully screened. This is on a par with other 
establishment level telephone surveys.
9  
 
III.a Three Indicators of Family-Friendly Policies and Practices  
 
  After asking a series of question about the characteristics of the establishment and 
its human resource policies, the interviewer posed the following question:    11
Q1  Suppose a [randomly-selected occupation] wanted to shift from a full-time to 
a part-time work schedule in order to care for a young child.  This employee 
would like to remain part-time for at least a year, and perhaps longer.  Would that 
be permitted in your establishment?   
 –  Yes 
  – No  
  – Depends _________________________ 
  – Don’t Know/Not Sure  
 
Prior to this question, the interviewer asked whether any of the establishment’s white-
collar workers fell into four occupational categories: (1) professionals (including 
technical workers), (2) managers or administrators, (3) sales personnel, (4) clerical or 
office workers. The “randomly selected occupation” in Q1 is one of these four 
occupational categories. If an establishment did not have white-collar employees in an 
occupational category (for example, if it did not include sales people), then that category 
was excluded from the random selection.  
  Table 1 presents the results of this question. Most establishments answer “yes,” 
although there is variation by occupation. In particular, managers have fewer 
opportunities to shift to part-time in order to care for a child. This is presumably because 
it is difficult for an establishment to have a part-time manager.   
  When a respondent answered Q1 with “depends,” we asked what it depends on. 
The vast majority of respondents indicated that it depends on what kind of work a person 
does and whether a part-time arrangement is feasible. For example,  
(It depends on) conditions that have to do with the ability to share work.  Some 
work such as accounting, does not share very well.  
 
Depends on position of the person and readily available shifting of work load 
 
(It depends on) if they had someone to job share with 
 
In certain positions, but in others it would be impossible. Our field staff comes to 
mind and several management positions do not lend themselves to part time work. 
 
Some departments may not be able to accommodate that, but there may be jobs in 
other departments that would allow that. They may also provide a temp.  
   12
In some cases, however, the response evidently depends on the employee who was asking 
for the shift and why they were asking.  
It would depend upon longevity and position. 
 
If he is a good salesman and they didn’t want to lose him they would want to work 
with him. 
 
We honor 12 wks of medical leave; beyond that it would be just depend on the 
circumstances 
 
The child would have to be very, very, ill. 
 
  For purposes of the subsequent analysis, responses to Q1 are coded into a variable 
called “Sick-Child” that takes 3 values: 0 = No; 1 = Depends; 2 = Yes. Observations with 
a response of “Don’t Know” or “Not Sure” are excluded from the analysis  Since the 
question pertains to different occupations in different establishments, the subsequent 
analysis uses occupation dummy variables to control for the randomly selected 
occupation. 
   Recall that the second goal of this paper is to examine the extent to which Sick-
Child is related to other policies that the literature treats as “family friendly.” Here we 
examine paid maternity and paternity leave. Previous assessments of employer 
responsiveness to work family issues use similar variables (e.g., Ingram and Simons 
(1995) and Wood (1999)). The variables used here arise out of the following questions:  
We would like to know a little about some of your establishment’s personnel 
policies. First, in order to make these questions more concrete, please think of a 
secure, full-time, white-collar position in your establishment that is occupied by 
an employee in good standing. Either as a matter of formal or informal policy, 
would your establishment allow this employee:  
 
(Q2) paid maternity leave 
  – Yes (= 2) 
  – In Some Cases (= 1) 
  – No (= 0) 
  – Don’t Know/Not Sure  
   
 
   13
(Q3) paid paternity leave    
  – Yes (= 2) 
  – In Some Cases (= 1) 
  – No (= 0) 
  – Don’t Know/Not Sure  
 
As with Q1, these variables are coded 0, 1 and 2. Cases with “Don’t Know/Not Sure” 
responses are excluded from the analysis  
  Although results on both Q2 and Q3 are presented below, for purposes of 
assessing an employer’s family friendliness, we have a preference for paid paternity 
leave. This is because paid maternity leave is often provided through paid sick leave 
policies, and that may not reveal family friendliness. In contrast, when paid paternity 
leave is provided, the firm must also provide paid maternity leave.
10 
  
III.b. Descriptive Statistics 
  Table 2 not only provides an overview of the data, but also permits initial steps 
toward the paper’s two goals. The first row of the table presents overall means for the 
three indicators of family friendly policy. Since the mean of 1.34 for Sick-Child lies 
between one and two, these results indicate that, on average, establishments allow 
workers to switch from full-time to part-time work to care for a young child.  The 
maternity leave and paternity leave variables have averages of 1.22 and .76 respectively, 
implying that paid maternity leave is more common than paid paternity leave. The 
subsequent rows in Table 2 give corresponding means for these indicators of family-
friendly policy when the sample is restricted to the left hand side categorical variable. For 
example, for establishments in the construction industry, the average value of Sick-Child 
is 1.44, while that for maternity and paternity leave are .78 and .22 respectively. Note that 
the asterisk next to the paternity leave average indicates that that average is statistically 
different from the overall mean at a .05 confidence level. While most of the variables in   14
Table 2 are self-explanatory, for those that are not, the appendix provides information on 
the relevant survey questions.  
For purposes of this paper’s first goal –understanding what types of 
establishments permit parents to shift to part-time work for purposes of child care –the 
important information is in the “Sick-Child” column of Table 2. Most of the statistically 
significant results in this column occur among the Section G proxies for the absence of 
minimum hours constraints. Establishments with job sharing, a flexible starting time, and 
part-time work are particularly likely to permit this shift from full-time to part-time. This 
is, of course, consistent with the second hypothesis.  
In contrast, Table 2 provides little support for the other hypotheses.  With regard 
to the first hypothesis, establishments in public administration do not have significantly 
higher averages for “Sick-Child”, nor is there evidence that the variable rises with 
organization size. While there is some indication that larger establishments tend to be 
more open to a shift to part-time for purposes of child-care, the first hypothesis pertains 
to organization size, not establishment size. Moreover, Table 2 provides no real support 
for the third and fourth hypothesis, since none of the Sick-Child results in section F or H 
are statistically significant. Of course, there remains the question of whether similar 
results are obtained in multivariate models.    
For purposes of the paper’s second goal –understanding whether an employer’s 
willingness to permit parents to shift to part-time work for purposes of child care is 
related to other “family friendly” policies –sections A through E of Table 2 are 
particularly relevant. Note that the results on paternity leave are thoroughly consistent 
with the first hypothesis, a hypothesis that arises of institutional theory. Specifically, 
public sector establishments and large organizations tend to provide paid paternity leave. 
Results on maternity leave are similar, at least with regard to size of organization. In   15
contrast, as noted above, there is no support for the first hypothesis in the Sick-Child 
column. Looking at the other sections of the table, variables that are statistically 
significant for “Sick-Child” are frequently not statistically significant for paid maternity 
or paternity leave. These results then strongly suggest that the forces underlying “Sick-
Child” differ from those underlying the other two family-friendly policies.  
That conclusion is reinforced by the correlations between the three variables. 
While paid paternity and maternity leave are positively correlated with each other (the 
correlation coefficient is +.60), Sick-Child is effectively uncorrelated with the other two;  
the correlation coefficient for Sick-Child and maternity leave is -.04, while that for 
paternity leave is .05. Thus, at least in terms of these simple correlations, there is no 
evidence that Sick-Child is related to the other family-friendly variables.  
 
IV. Establishment Characteristics and Sick-Child: Ordered Probit Results  
  Multivariate models provide another path to the paper’s two goals. In line with the 
first goal, Table 3 presents ordered probit models of Sick-Child, i.e., the employer’s 
response to Q1.  Ordered probits are used because the dependent variable takes three 
values: 0 if the employee cannot shift to part-time to care for a sick child, 2 if an 
employee can shift to part-time, and 1 if the employer’s response is “depends.” As is the 
case with any survey based on voluntary participation in interviews, some respondents 
did not answer all of the questions. In the subsequent multivariate work we address that 
through listwise deletion, whereby any observation with missing data is excluded. As a 
result, the analysis is based on 631 observations.
11 
 The first model in Table 3 includes variables that determine the economic and 
organizational environment within which the establishment operates. Included here are 
measures of industry, establishment and organization size, whether the establishment is   16
part of a larger organization, the percent of the establishment’s workforce that is white 
collar, and dummy variables indicating the randomly selected occupation that was used 
when asking Q1. While most of these variables are simply controls, the first hypothesis 
predicts that both the industry dummies and the measures of organizational size will 
follow a specific pattern. In accordance with the first hypothesis, establishments that are 
in public administration and that are part of a large organization are expected to permit 
employees to shift from full-time to part-time for purposes of child care. In fact, the 
coefficient on public administration is neither particularly large nor statistically 
significant, and the organization size dummy variables do not increase with 
organizational size. Indeed, establishments that belong to larger organizations have 
significantly lower values of Sick-Child. There is no evidence here in support of the first 
hypothesis.   
The second model in Table 3 examines the effects of minimum hours constraints. 
From the second hypothesis we expect a positive coefficient on the percent of white 
collar workers who are part-timers, as well as the dummy variables indicating that the 
establishment permits job sharing and the establishment has flexible starting times. This 
is exactly what happens. There is then solid support for the hypothesis that when 
establishments use technologies that involve minimum hours constraints, they tend to 
limit a parent’s opportunities to change working hours in order to care for a child.   
The third model in Table 3 examines the third hypothesis by introducing a set of 
demographic variables. As noted above, of particular importance is the percent female. 
We expect a positive coefficient on percent female, i.e., establishments with a higher 
percent female should have higher values of Sick-Child. In fact, the coefficient is 
negative and statistically insignificant. Results on percent union and the age composition   17
of the white-collar workforce are also only weakly related to the Sick-Child variable. 
There is then no evidence here in support of the third hypothesis.  
The fourth model in Table 3 introduces a set of proxies for testing the fourth 
hypothesis, whereby establishments characterized by long-term employment relationships 
are more likely to pursue family-friendly policies. In accordance with that hypothesis, 
Sick-Child should be positively related to indicators of long-term employment 
relationships (employer provided formal training, 45 year old workers remaining to 
retirement, filling jobs from within, percent of white-collar workers with 15+ years in the 
establishment). Although some of the coefficients are positive, none are statistically 
significant. In consequence, there is no support for the fourth hypothesis either.  
Model 5 tests for robustness.  The results from Models 1 – 4 are unaffected by 
including all of the variables in one model. Thus, the evidence in these multivariate 
models is similar to that in the Table 2 cross-tabulations: minimum hours constraints play 
a major role in influencing opportunities for parents to shift from full-time to part-time in 
order to care for a child. None of the other hypotheses are supported by the data. Indeed, 
in contrast to the first hypothesis, establishments that are part of a larger organization are 
less likely to pursue this family-friendly policy.  
We conclude that establishments permitting workers to move from full-time to 
part-time for purposes of childcare tend to be characterized by flexibility. They are not 
usually part of larger organizations, and they have policies like job sharing and flexible 
starting times that reveal openness to alternative work-schedules. Not only are they small, 
but they are probably accustomed to handling family demands and crises through 
informal arrangements.  
That conclusion leads logically to the paper’s second goal: examining the extent 
to which workplaces that permit a childcare oriented shift from full-time to part-time also   18
have the kinds of family-friendly policies that are discussed in the literature, e.g., paid 
maternity and paternity leave. Since, as noted above, there is almost a zero correlation 
between Sick-Child and the measures of paid maternity and paternity leave, it is 
reasonable to expect that different explanatory variables will be important when each of 
these measures is used as a dependent variable in a multivariate model.  
And that is the case. Table 4 presents estimates of the Table 3 models, but with 
the establishment’s policy on paid paternity leave as the dependent variable. Although 
one could do the same with maternity leave, a single table suffices to make the point: the 
results are quite different from those in Table 3. In both Tables 3 and 4 we are estimating 
ordered probits, and in both cases the dependent variable takes three values (0, 1, 2). 
Comparing the model in column 5 of Table 3 with the model in column 5 of Table 4, the 
signs on 11 of the 36 coefficients differ. Moreover, unlike Sick-Child, paid paternity 
leave is strongly and positively related to being in Public Administration and size of 
organization; as the number of employees in the organization increase, the coefficients 
become increasingly positive, with the coefficient on organizations with more than 1000 
employees being positive and statistically significant. This is similar to the findings in 
Ingram and Simons (1995), Osterman (1995), and Wood (1999). Note that despite the 
differences between the two tables, there are some similarities. In particular, there is a 
positive relationship between flexible starting times and both “Sick-Child” and “Paid 
Paternity Leave.” The larger message of Table 4 is, however, that the determinants of 
paid paternity leave are quite different from the determinants of opportunities to move 
from full-time to part-time in order to care for a young child. While both are family-
friendly policies, they are driven by different forces.  
One could argue that this conclusion only applies to observable variables. There 
may conceivably be unobserved variables that influence both “Sick-Child” and “Paid   19
Paternity Leave.” For example, there could be a special employer attitude towards 
employee needs that permeates the employer’s response to a situation involving sick 
children or the need for paternity leave. By this argument, the explanatory variables in the 
ordered probits fail to measure an unobserved employer ethos. Had it been measured and 
included in the model, we would have found strong evidence of a common factor, and 
concluded that both Sick-Child and Paid Paternity Leave were driven by similar forces.  
One way to check for this is to estimate a bivariate model and examine the 
correlation between the error terms. We thus estimated several bivariate probits that 
conditioned on the variables in Tables 3 and 4. No matter how the bivariate probit was 
specified, the estimated value of the correlation between the errors (“rho” in the parlence 
of bivariate probit estimation) was never statistically different from zero and often 
negative. Thus, there is no evidence of an important latent factor that is common to the 
two models. Again, all the evidence indicates that we are dealing with different 
phenomena here. Both paid paternity leave and permitting shifts to part-time for purposes 
of childcare can be viewed as family-friendly policies, but different forces drive them.  
 
V. Conclusion 
  This paper indicates that different types of employers pursue different types of 
family-friendly policies. In particular, large organizations are much more likely to 
provide paid  maternity and paternity leave, while establishments that are not part of a 
larger organization are more likely to permit an employee to shift to part-time in order to 
care for a young child. An explanation for family-friendly policies needs to account for 
these different patterns of behavior.   
Certainly part of the explanation is cost. Large organizations can more easily 
provide fringe benefits like paternity leave, pensions, life insurance, and childcare   20
subsidies because they are able to reap the benefits of economies of scale. Other things 
equal, the cost of an additional person on paternity leave or an additional pension plan 
participant is almost certainly lower for a large organization than a small organization. 
Moreover, while permitting employees to work different hours on different schedules 
could create a coordination nightmare in a large organization, a small organization with 
one or two establishments may be able to handle multiple schedules through informal 
arrangements.  If an organization seeks to be family-friendly, then it is likely to do so in a 
way that minimizes cost. And that could very well translate into different policies for 
different types of employers. By implication, the absence of formal policies like paid 
paternity leave should not be read – in and of itself – as a failure to address work-family 
issues. This is especially true for smaller employers. 
Another part of the explanation for why different types of employers pursue 
different types of family-friendly policies may lie in the extent to which a policy is 
visible to outside parties. Institutional theory in sociology emphasizes how different types 
of organizations face different pressures for involvement in work-family issues. For 
example, as noted above, public sector organizations are expected to be more responsive 
to work-family issues because they are subject to a higher level of scrutiny from external 
parties (e.g., the media). This hypothesis seems eminently plausible. One implication 
would seem to be that such an employer is likely to respond with policies that are visible 
to outside parties. Paid paternity leave is such a policy. It is easy for an outsider to verify 
that the policy exists and that male employees with children have benefited from it. 
Permitting parents to shift from full-time to part-time in order to care for a young child 
may be a much less visible policy. Outside parties can not easily determine how the 
policy is implemented or whether the arrangement works in a way that is satisfactory to 
parents. If an employer is responding to outside pressures and must choose between two   21
equally costly policies, one of which is visible to outside parties and the other effectively 
invisible, than the employer is likely to choose the more visible policy. Thus, something 
similar to conspicuous consumption could be part of the explanation for why different 
employers pursue different policies.  
Viewed from that perspective, the Sick-Child policy considered here may lie 
outside the set of family-friendly policies explained by institutional theory in sociology. 
Institutional theory may be effective in explaining policies that are especially visible to 
outside parties; perhaps a policy of permitting shifts from full-time to part-time for 
purposes of childcare falls outside a boundary that defines what is “especially visible.” 
By implication, it may be fruitful for future theorists to examine and explain the locus of 
that boundary.  
Finally, the results in this paper lead to a point about indexes of family friendly 
policies. There is no question that the employer policies considered in this paper – 
policies such as paid paternity leave or permitting parents to shift to part-time work for 
purposes of caring for a child – are family-friendly policies. But the evidence indicates 
that these policies are determined by different forces. Lumping these and similar policies 
together in a single index may obscure important relationships that could be more fully 
understood by looking at the separate components. The point is similar to Christopher 
Jenck’s comments on the concept of underclass (Jencks, 1992). While out of wedlock 
births and criminal behavior may well be elements of a “meta-problem,” they are 
arguably determined by very different social and economic forces. From a social science 
perspective, the best strategy for enhancing knowledge may be to focus on understanding 
what determines the separate components.  
 




Table 1. Responses to Q1 by Occupational Category  
         Occupational Category       
     Clerical  Manager   Professional Sales Total   
Number of Cases:   300 297  259  91  947 
 
Does Establishment Permit   
Shift to Part-Time for           
Purposes of Childcare? 
 (weighted percentages)          
         
      Yes    53% 42%  55% 47%  49% 
      Depends    19% 18%  20% 19%  19% 
      No    19% 29%  19% 25%  23% 
      DK or NA    9% 11%  6%  9%  9% 
      Total    100% 100%  100% 100%  100% 
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Stand. Stand. Stand. 
Mean Error Mean Error Mean Error
All Observations 1.34 (0.03) 1.22 (0.04) 0.76 (0.04)
A. Industry of Establishment
Construction 1.44  (0.24) 0.78  (0.34) 0.22 * (0.22)
Manufacturing 1.23  (0.08) 1.31  (0.09) 0.51 * (0.08)
Transport, Comm., and Utilities 1.14  (0.15) 1.08  (0.17) 0.37 * (0.13)
Wholesale and Retail Trade 1.34   (0.10) 0.96 * (0.12) 0.57   (0.11)
Finance, Insur., and Real Estate 1.51   (0.15) 1.41   (0.18) 1.03   (0.20)
Services 1.42  (0.08) 1.18  (0.10) 0.65   (0.09)
Health, Ed. and Social Services 1.36  (0.06) 1.28  (0.06) 0.92 * (0.07)
Public Administration 1.30   (0.11) 1.33   (0.12) 1.19 * (0.13)
B. Region of Establishment
Central 1.38  (0.06) 1.21  (0.07) 0.78   (0.07)
South 1.23 * (0.06) 1.21  (0.07) 0.71  (0.07)
East 1.36   (0.07) 1.22   (0.09) 0.60 * (0.09)
West 1.43  (0.07) 1.24  (0.08) 0.92 * (0.09)
C. Size of Establishment
Less than 50 employees 1.32   (0.07) 1.29   (0.07) 0.76   (0.08)
50 to 99 employees 1.39   (0.08) 1.16   (0.09) 0.83   (0.09)
100  to 249 employees 1.29   (0.06) 1.12   (0.07) 0.58 * (0.06)
250 to 999 employees 1.30   (0.08) 1.21   (0.09) 0.80   (0.09)
1000 or more employees 1.58 * (0.12) 1.30   (0.17) 1.12 * (0.17)
D. Size of Organization
Less than 50 employees 1.42   (0.07) 1.17   (0.10) 0.63   (0.09)
50 to 99 employees 1.48   (0.09) 1.02   (0.12) 0.76   (0.12)
100 to 249 employees 1.31   (0.07) 0.95 * (0.09) 0.52 * (0.07)
250 to 999 employees 1.22   (0.08) 1.37 * (0.08) 0.94 * (0.09)
1000 or more employees 1.24   (0.06) 1.52 * (0.06) 0.97 * (0.07)
E. Establishment is Part Of Larger Org. 1.13 * (0.06) 1.50 * (0.06) 0.94 * (0.07)
F. Demographics of the Establishment 
Percent of All Workers that are WC:
Less than 75% 1.37   (0.04) 1.09 * (0.05) 0.64 * (0.05)
75% or more 1.31   (0.05) 1.37 * (0.05) 0.89 * (0.06)
Percent of WC that are Unionized
None (0%) 1.35   (0.04) 1.17 * (0.04) 0.67 * (0.04)
Some (More than 0%) 1.30   (0.07) 1.40 * (0.07) 1.07 * (0.08)
Percent of WC that are Female
50% or less 1.33   (0.05) 1.19   (0.06) 0.66 * (0.05)
More than 50% 1.35   (0.04) 1.24   (0.05) 0.84 * (0.05)
Percent of WC Under 35 Yrs Of Age:
30% or less 1.38   (0.04) 1.15 * (0.05) 0.78   (0.05)
More than 30% 1.28   (0.05) 1.32 * (0.06) 0.73   (0.06)
Variable
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Three Family-Friendly Variables (weighted)
Sick-Child Maternity Leave Paternity Leave
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Sick- Maternity Paternity
Child Stand. Leave Stand. Leave Stand. 
Mean Error Mean Error Mean Error
All Observations 1.34 (0.03) 1.22 (0.04) 0.76 (0.04)
F. Demographics of the Establishment (Continued) 
Percent of WC Over 54 Yrs Of Age:
10% or less 1.29   (0.06) 1.34 * (0.06) 0.86   (0.06)
More than 10% 1.37   (0.04) 1.15 * (0.05) 0.70   (0.05)
G. Proxies for Absence of Minimum Hours Constraints 
Establishment Has Job Sharing 1.61 * (0.04) 1.32 * (0.06) 0.90 * (0.06)
Establishment has Flexible Starting Time  1.48 * (0.04) 1.24   (0.05) 0.82 * (0.05)
Percent Of Work Force That Is Part-Time:
None (0%) 1.11 * (0.06) 1.23   (0.06) 0.83   (0.06)
Some (More than 0%) 1.48 * (0.04) 1.21   (0.05) 0.71   (0.05)
H. Proxies for Long-term Employment Relationships
Establishment Provides Formal Training 1.35   (0.03) 1.26 * (0.04) 0.79 * (0.04)
How Likely 45 Yr Old to Stay To Retirement?:
Unlikely 1.36  (0.06) 1.08 * (0.08) 0.54 * (0.07)
Likely 1.34  (0.04) 1.27 * (0.04) 0.84 * (0.05)
How Important to Fill Jobs from Within? 
Not Important 1.30   (0.08) 1.27   (0.08) 0.69   (0.08)
Important 1.35   (0.04) 1.20   (0.04) 0.77   (0.04)
Percect of WC with 3 Yrs or Less Tenure:
20% or less 1.31   (0.05) 1.34 * (0.05) 0.90 * (0.05)
More than 20% 1.37   (0.05) 1.10 * (0.06) 0.62 * (0.05)
Percent of WC with 15 Yrs or More Tenure:
15% or less 1.34   (0.05) 1.16   (0.05) 0.65 * (0.05)
More than 15% 1.35 (0.05) 1.28 (0.05) 0.88 * (0.06)
Table 2 (Continued)
Descriptive Statistics for Three Family-Friendly Variables
Variable
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Coeff. SD Coeff. SD Coeff. SD
Industry of Establishment
a
Manufacturing 0.2017 (0.406) 0.0631 (0.424) 0.2115  (0.410)
Transport, Comm., and Utilities -0.2515 (0.438) -0.4311 (0.457) -0.1986  (0.442)
Wholesale and Retail trade 0.1391 (0.409) -0.0333 (0.427) 0.1574   (0.414)
Finance, Insur. and Real Estate 0.4721 (0.464) 0.0771 (0.484) 0.5103   (0.476)
Services 0.3278 (0.406) 0.0175 (0.425) 0.3739  (0.413)
Health, Ed. and Social Services 0.3623 (0.401) 0.0154 (0.422) 0.4930  (0.421)
Public Administration -0.0058 (0.423) -0.1811 (0.441) 0.0765   (0.431)
Region of Establishment
a  
Central 0.1597 (0.142) 0.1307 (0.147) 0.1612  (0.143)
South -0.0365 (0.141) 0.0989 (0.146) -0.0843  (0.146)
West 0.1818 (0.152) 0.1124 (0.157) 0.1945  (0.153)
Size of Establishment
a  
50 to 99 employees 0.0797 (0.210) -0.0222 (0.216) 0.1085   (0.212)
100 to 249 employees 0.0251 (0.197) -0.0080 (0.202) 0.0282   (0.199)
250 to 999 employees -0.0093 (0.219) -0.0724 (0.226) -0.0110   (0.222)
1000 or more employees 0.3054 (0.301) 0.1980 (0.311) 0.3038   (0.302)
Size of Organization
a  
50 to 99 employees 0.0415 (0.262) 0.0327 (0.270) 0.0859   (0.264)
100  to 249 employees -0.1067 (0.235) -0.0665 (0.241) -0.0703   (0.238)
250 to 999 employees -0.1588 (0.245) -0.0983 (0.252) -0.1229   (0.247)
1000 or more employees -0.0004 (0.282) 0.0191 (0.289) 0.0316   (0.283)
Establishment is Part Of Larger Org. -0.4123 * (0.152) -0.3671 * (0.155) -0.3646 * (0.155)
Occupation
Percent of all that are White Collar 0.0002 (0.002) -0.0004 (0.002) 0.0008   (0.002)
Target Occupation for  Q1:
a
   Clerical  0.2448 (0.181) 0.3748 * (0.186) 0.2457   (0.182)
   Professional 0.2706 (0.182) 0.3738 * (0.187) 0.2727   (0.183)
   Manager -0.0808 (0.179) 0.0396 (0.183) -0.0796   (0.179)
Proxies for Minimum Hours Constraints
Permit Job Sharing 0.6075 * (0.109)
Flexible Starting Times  0.4661 * (0.110)
Percent Part-Time 0.0171 * (0.008)
Square of Percent Part-Time -0.0001 (0.000)
Demographics Of The Establishment
Pct White Collar (WC) that are female  -0.0013   (0.002)
Pct WC that are unionized -0.0028   (0.002)
Pct WC Under 35 Yrs Of Age 0.0005   (0.003)
Pct WC Over 54 Yrs Of Age 0.0044   (0.003)
Proxies for Long-Term Employment Relationships  
Establishment Provides Formal Training
45 Yr Old Likely to Stay to Retirement
Important to Fill Jobs from Within
Pct WC With Job Tenure < 4 Yrs
Pct WC With Job Tenure > 15 Yrs
Cut Points
Cut 1 -0.4339 (0.432) 0.0277 (0.452) -0.3048 (0.451)
Cut 2 0.2019 (0.432) 0.7283 (0.452) 0.3349 (0.451)
Pseudo R-Square 0.0393 0.1010 0.0429
Log Likelihood -612.53 -573.19 -610.25
N 631 631 631
LR Chi-Square (P-Value)  50.11 (0.00) 128.79 (0.00) 54.67 (0.00)
Table 3 
Employer's Response to Q1 about Shifting to Part-time to Care for a Sick Child Was, 
0 = No, 1 = Depends, or 2 = Yes: Ordered Probit Models
Variable Name 




   26
Coeff. SD Coeff. SD
Industry of Establishment
a
Manufacturing 0.2194 (0.408) 0.1586  (0.428)
Transport, Comm., and Utilities -0.2362 (0.443) -0.2803  (0.465)
Wholesale and Retail trade 0.1710 (0.414) 0.0880   (0.435)
Finance, Insur. and Real Estate 0.4871 (0.467) 0.2612   (0.496)
Services 0.3076 (0.410) 0.1444  (0.433)
Health, Ed. and Social Services 0.3927 (0.404) 0.2647  (0.443)
Public Administration 0.0586 (0.425) 0.0006   (0.451)
Region of Establishment
a  
Central 0.1407 (0.143) 0.1376  (0.149)
South -0.0640 (0.142) 0.0662  (0.152)
West 0.1434 (0.154) 0.1029  (0.158)
Size of Establishment
a  
50 to 99 employees 0.0817 (0.211) 0.0074   (0.220)
100 to 249 employees 0.0231 (0.198) -0.0093   (0.205)
250 to 999 employees -0.0183 (0.220) -0.0821   (0.230)
1000 or more employees 0.3000 (0.301) 0.2013   (0.313)
Size of Organization
a  
50 to 99 employees 0.0059 (0.266) 0.0061   (0.276)
100  to 249 employees -0.1396 (0.239) -0.0653   (0.248)
250 to 999 employees -0.1724 (0.249) -0.0916   (0.256)
1000 or more employees -0.0007 (0.284) 0.0454   (0.294)
Establishment is Part Of Larger Org. -0.4154 * (0.153) -0.3637 * (0.160)
Occupation
Percent of all that are White Collar -0.0002 (0.002) 0.0001   (0.002)
Target Occupation for  Q1:
a
   Clerical  0.2400 (0.182) 0.3477   (0.188)
   Professional 0.2762 (0.184) 0.3563   (0.189)
   Manager -0.0792 (0.180) 0.0278   (0.185)
Proxies for Minimum Hours Constraints
Permit Job Sharing 0.6300 * (0.110)
Flexible Starting Times  0.4189 * (0.113)
Percent Part-Time 0.0176 * (0.009)
Square of Percent Part-Time -0.0001   (0.000)
Demographics Of The Establishment
Pct White Collar (WC) that are female  -0.0033   (0.002)
Pct WC that are unionized -0.0014   (0.002)
Pct WC Under 35 Yrs Of Age 0.0002   (0.003)
Pct WC Over 54 Yrs Of Age 0.0046   (0.003)
Proxies for Long-Term Employment Relationships
Establishment has Formal Training -0.0318 (0.039) -0.0349   (0.040)
45 Yr Old Likely to Stay to Retirement 0.0583 (0.053) 0.0732   (0.054)
Important to Fill Jobs from Within -0.0022 (0.053) 0.0000  (0.054)
Pct WC With Job Tenure < 4 Yrs 0.0008 (0.002) -0.0008   (0.002)
Pct WC With Job Tenure > 15 Yrs -0.0042 (0.002) -0.0044   (0.002)
Cut Points
Cut 1 -0.3707 (0.549) 0.1947 (0.579)
Cut 2 0.2693 (0.548) 0.9028 (0.579)
Pseudo R-Square 0.0438 0.1078
Log Likelihood -609.67 -568.84
N 631 631
LR Chi-Square (P-Value)  55.82 (0.00) 137.49 (0.00)
a. The excluded industry is construction, the excluded region is East, the excluded establishment
 size is 20-49, and the excluded organization size is 20-49
* t-statistic > 1.96 implying coefficient is different from zero at a .05 confidence level. 
Table 3 (Continued) 
Model 4
Variable Name 
Employer's Response to Q1 about Shifting to Part-time to Care for a Sick Child Was,
 0 = No, 1 = Depends, or 2 = Yes: Ordered Probit Models
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Coeff. SD Coeff. SD Coeff. SD
Industry of Establishment
a
Manufacturing 0.3561 (0.516) 0.3231 (0.520) 0.4052 (0.513)
Transport, Comm., and Utilities -0.0718 (0.554) -0.0694 (0.560) 0.0152 (0.553)
Wholesale and Retail trade 0.1530 (0.522) 0.1296 (0.526) 0.2174 (0.520)
Finance, Insur. and Real Estate 0.6154 (0.563) 0.5805 (0.570) 0.7922 (0.570)
Services 0.5403 (0.515) 0.4905 (0.520) 0.6391 (0.516)
Health, Ed. and Social Services 0.5898 (0.509) 0.5922 (0.516) 0.7782 (0.522)
Public Administration 1.0071 (0.530) 0.9981 (0.534) 1.1301 * (0.532)
Region of Establishment
a
Central 0.1916 (0.154) 0.1548 (0.155) 0.1993 (0.156)
South 0.0942 (0.155) 0.0900 (0.158) 0.0868 (0.162)
West 0.3630 * (0.166) 0.3188 (0.167) 0.3646 * (0.166)
Size of Establishment
a
50 to 99 employees -0.1876 (0.222) -0.2050 (0.223) -0.1846 (0.225)
100 to 249 employees -0.3951 (0.214) -0.3902 (0.215) -0.3936 (0.216)
250 to 999 employees -0.4463 (0.239) -0.4460 (0.242) -0.4500 (0.242)
1000 or more employees -0.3490 (0.321) -0.3759 (0.327) -0.3518 (0.324)
Size of Organization
a
50 to 99 employees 0.3302 (0.278) 0.3116 (0.279) 0.3112 (0.280)
100  to 249 employees 0.2496 (0.255) 0.2453 (0.257) 0.2439 (0.258)
250 to 999 employees 0.5932 * (0.266) 0.5950 * (0.269) 0.5863 * (0.267)
1000 or more employees 0.8597 * (0.310) 0.8194 * (0.314) 0.8568 * (0.311)
Establishment is Part Of Larger Org. -0.1224 (0.166) -0.0861 (0.167) -0.1274 (0.169)
Occupation
Percent of all that are White Collar 0.0005 (0.002) 0.0006 (0.002) 0.0008 (0.002)
Target Occupation for  Q1:
a
   Clerical  0.1443 (0.204) 0.1568 (0.206) 0.1300 (0.205)
   Professional 0.1139 (0.205) 0.1410 (0.206) 0.1113 (0.205)
   Manager 0.1312 (0.203) 0.1375 (0.205) 0.1164 (0.203)
Proxies for Minimum Hours Constraints
Permit Job Sharing 0.1608 (0.114)
Flexible Starting Times  0.2225 (0.121)
Percent Part-Time -0.0076 (0.009)
Square of Percent Part-Time 0.0001 (0.000)
Demographics Of The Establishment
Pct White Collar (WC) that are female  -0.0038 (0.003)
Pct WC that are unionized 0.0001 (0.002)
Pct WC Under 35 Yrs Of Age -0.0013 (0.003)
Pct WC Over 54 Yrs Of Age -0.0016 (0.003)
Proxies for Long-Term Employment Relationships
Establishment Provides Formal Training
45 Yr Old Likely to Stay to Retirement
Important to Fill Jobs from Within
Pct WC With Job Tenure < 4 Yrs
Pct WC With Job Tenure > 15 Yrs
Cut Points
Cut 1 1.1977 (0.547) 1.3516 (0.557) 1.0321 (0.562)
Cut 2 1.2595 (0.548) 1.4141 (0.557) 1.0942 (0.562)
Pseudo R-Square 0.0620 0.0699 0.0650
Log Likelihood -452.93 -449.13 -451.51
N 631 631 631
LR Chi-Square (P-Value)  59.92 (0.00) 67.52 (0.00) 62.76 (0.00)
Table 4 
Employer's Response to Q3 about Paid Paternity Leave Was, 0 = No, 1 = In Some Cases,
or 2 = Yes: Ordered Probit Models
Variable Name 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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Coeff. SD Coeff. SD
Industry of Establishment
a
Manufacturing 0.4254 (0.523) 0.4170  (0.527)
Transport, Comm., and Utilities 0.0555 (0.563) 0.1204  (0.569)
Wholesale and Retail trade 0.2506 (0.531) 0.2642   (0.536)
Finance, Insur. and Real Estate 0.7248 (0.572) 0.8405   (0.586)
Services 0.6793 (0.524) 0.7018  (0.531)
Health, Ed. and Social Services 0.6708 (0.517) 0.8591  (0.539)
Public Administration 1.0142 (0.537) 1.1300 * (0.548)
Region of Establishment
a  
Central 0.1920 (0.156) 0.1573  (0.158)
South 0.1240 (0.157) 0.1091  (0.165)
West 0.3860 * (0.167) 0.3460 * (0.169)
Size of Establishment
a  
50 to 99 employees -0.1799 (0.224) -0.1947   (0.229)
100 to 249 employees -0.3964 (0.215) -0.3935   (0.219)
250 to 999 employees -0.4816 * (0.241) -0.5078 * (0.249)
1000 or more employees -0.3322 (0.323) -0.3890   (0.332)
Size of Organization
a  
50 to 99 employees 0.3090 (0.283) 0.2635   (0.286)
100  to 249 employees 0.2523 (0.259) 0.2294   (0.264)
250 to 999 employees 0.6354 * (0.269) 0.6372 * (0.274)
1000 or more employees 0.8615 * (0.313) 0.8337 * (0.319)
Establishment is Part Of Larger Org. -0.1619 (0.167) -0.1297   (0.173)
Occupation
Percent of all that are White Collar 0.0007 (0.002) 0.0009   (0.002)
Target Occupation for  Q1:
a
   Clerical  0.1240 (0.207) 0.1392   (0.209)
   Professional 0.0886 (0.208) 0.1268   (0.210)
   Manager 0.0803 (0.206) 0.0763   (0.208)
Proxies for Minimum Hours Constraints
Permit Job Sharing 0.1522   (0.115)
Flexible Starting Times  0.2702 * (0.125)
Percent Part-Time -0.0050   (0.009)
Square of Percent Part-Time 0.0001   (0.000)
Demographics Of The Establishment
Pct White Collar (WC) that are female  -0.0041   (0.003)
Pct WC that are unionized -0.0005   (0.002)
Pct WC Under 35 Yrs Of Age -0.0009   (0.003)
Pct WC Over 54 Yrs Of Age -0.0042   (0.004)
Proxies for Long-Term Employment Relationships
Establishment has Formal Training -0.0406 (0.044) -0.0325   (0.045)
45 Yr Old Likely to Stay to Retirement 0.0395 (0.058) 0.0514   (0.059)
Important to Fill Jobs from Within 0.0483 (0.058) 0.0580  (0.059)
Pct WC With Job Tenure < 4 Yrs 0.0011 (0.002) 0.0017   (0.002)
Pct WC With Job Tenure > 15 Yrs 0.0057 * (0.002) 0.0069 * (0.002)
Cut Points
Cut 1 1.7346 (0.668) 1.8315 (0.686)
Cut 2 1.7972 (0.668) 1.8952 (0.686)
Pseudo R-Square 0.0713 0.0844
Log Likelihood -448.48 -442.11
N 631 631
LR Chi-Square (P-Value)  68.82 (0.00) 81.56 (0.00)
a. The excluded industry is construction, the excluded region is East, the excluded establishment
 size is 20-49, and the excluded organization size is 20-49




Employer's Response to Q3 about Paid Paternity Leave Was, 0 = No, 1 = In Some Cases,
 or 2 = Yes: Ordered Probit Models
Table 4 (Continued)
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Appendix  
 
While most of the variables in Table 2 are self-explanatory, further explanation 
may be useful for some.  The following focuses on sections F-H of Table 2.  
 
Demographics of the Establishment:  
Respondents were asked for their best estimates of the fraction of the establishment’s 
employees who fall into different demographic categories. For example,  
-- About (what percent/how many) of the regular full and part-time employees at your 
establishment are white-collar employees”(probe: what is your best estimate?) 
- About (what percent/how many) of the white-collar employees at this establishment 
are age 55 or over? (probe: what’s your best estimate?) 
The same form of question was asked for white collar employees under age 35, women, 
coverage by a collective bargaining agreement, worked 3 years or less (15 years or more), 
and work fewer than 35 hours per week.  
 
Proxies for Absence of Minimum Hours Constraints:  
Respondents were asked the following question:     
First, in order to make these questions more concrete, please think of a secure, full-time 
white-collar position in your establishment that is occupied by an employee in good standing. 
Either as a matter of formal or informal policy, would your establishment allow this 
employee:  
-- flexible starting time?  
Yes/ In Some Cases/ No/ Don’t Know; Not Sure/ Refuse; NA  
-- job sharing, where two employees split one full-time job?  
Yes/ In Some Cases/ No/ Don’t Know; Not Sure/ Refuse; NA  
The other proxy for the absence of minimum hours constraints came from a question 
about what percent of the white-collar employees at the establishment worked fewer than 
35 hours per week, which is the way the U.S. Government defines part-time. 
 
Proxies for Long-term Employment Relationships:  
The variable, “Establishment Provides Formal Training,” was obtained as 
follows:  
The next question asks about structured or formal training. This may be offered at 
your establishment or at another location and may occur during working hours or 
at other times.  Formal training includes all types of training activities that have a 
pre-defined objective, not just informal on-the-job training. (Read if necessary:  
Examples of formal training include seminars, workshops, audio-visual  
presentations, or apprenticeships.) Do you pay for, or actually provide, any formal 
training by supervisors or outside contractors, at a school or technical institute, or 
somewhere else?  
        Yes/ No/ Don’t Know; Not Sure/ Refuse; NA 
  
The variables labeled, “How Likely 45 Yr Old Stay to Retirement,” and “How 
Important to Fill Jobs from Within,” come from the following two questions:  
– In some organizations a white-collar worker who has reached age 45 is almost 
certain to remain with that organization until retirement.  In other organizations, a 
45-year-old white-collar worker may be likely to change employers before 
retirement. On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means not at all likely and 5 means 
very likely, how likely is it that an average 45-year-old white-collar worker would   30
stay at your establishment until retirement? (In Table 2 “likely” means the rating 
was 4 or 5.)  
– We'd like to know how much preference is given to someone already employed 
in the establishment when you fill permanent white-collar jobs above the entry 
level. On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means not at all important and 5 means very 
important, how important would you say it is to give preference to someone 
already employed in the establishment? (In Table 2 “important” means the rating 
was 4 or 5.)  
The two variables labeled, “Percent of White Collar with 3 Yrs or Less Tenure” and 
“Percent of White Collar with 15 Yrs or More Tenure,” come from a pair of questions 
that ask the respondent for the approximate tenure distribution of white-collar workers at 
the establishment.    31
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Endnotes 
 
                                                 
1 On part-time, see Rosen (1978) and Montgomery (1988).  On fringes see Ehrenberg and Smith (1983), 
and Lazear (1998), Chapter 15.   
2 In particular, see Ingram and Simons (1995) and Goodstein (1994). Wood (1999) provides a good review.  
3 See Wood (1999) for a discussion of institutional theory and a useful empirical test.  
4 The emphasis on internal labor markets in Osterman (1995) yields a similar hypothesis. 
5 We focused on formal training because informal training is so ubiquitous that a question about informal 
training would have little content. Note also that formal training is not included in the list of proxies for 
minimum hours constraints. This is because we have good proxies for whether or not firms imose minimum 
hours constraints (e.g., whether workers can job share and the percent of workers who are part-time). Here 
we are especially interested in the effect of training conditional on those proxies.  
6  Several authors note that due to differences in technology, the economic cost of implementing work-
family policies can differ across employers (Ingram and Simons, p. 1470; Osterman, p. 692; Barringer 
Milkovich, p. 317). Minimum hours constraints could be viewed as a logical consequence of such cost 
differences. Similarly, the fourth hypothesis with its focus on long-term relationships between workers and 
firms is at least implicit in the sociological literature. For example, Ingram and Simons (1995) argue that if 
an organization fails to exhibit sufficient work-family responsiveness, it may have difficult recruiting and 
retaining employees (p. 1469). In making their argument they cite several sociological sources. 
7 To implement the restriction to white-collar employees, the interviewer indicated that white-collar means 
professionals, including technical workers, managers and administrators, sales personnel, and clerical and 
office workers. The restriction to white-collar was due to the need for detailed information in a relatively 
brief survey. A thorough treatment of both blue and white-collar workers would have required a longer 
survey and resulted in lower response rates.  
8 While the latter restriction is ideal for a study of phased retirement (it insures that questions about phased 
retirement are relevant to the establishment’s current situation), it could conceivably complicate a study of 
establishment level work-family practices. In particular, if establishments with two or more white collar 
employees over age 55 have unobserved characteristics associated with their handling of work-family 
issues, then there could be a problem with sample selection bias. Since there is no way to know whether 
this is a problem, we checked for robustness by re-estimating models in samples that are restricted to large 
(more than 100 employees) establishments. Sample selection should be less of a problem in large 
establishments, since most large establishments will pass the test of having two or more older white-collar 
workers. The re-estimated models were, in fact, quite similar to those estimated in the full sample. In 
particular, a test of the null hypothesis that coefficients in the 100+ sample are the same as those in model 5 
of Table 3 fails to reject the null at a .20 level. 
9 The response rate was 64% in the Educational Quality of the Workforce National Employers Survey, 
which was administered by the U.S. Bureau of the Census as a telephone survey in August and September 
1994 to a nationally representative sample of private establishments with more than 20 employees (Lynch 
and Black, 1998). The response rate was 65.5 percent in Osterman’s 1992 telephone survey of 
establishments with more than 50 employees (Osterman, January 1994). Holzer and Neumark (1999) report 
a response rate of 67% for establishments that were successfully screened in a telephone survey undertaken 
between June 1992 and May 1994.  
10 We are indebted to Eileen Trzcinski for pointing this out.  
11 See Allison (2002) for a discussion of the advantages of listwise deletion. Hutchens-Grace Martin (2006) 
uses multiple imputation to address missing data issues in this survey. Those results indicated that missing 
data is not causing serious bias in the coefficients.  